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The interdependence between governance and legitimacy of the courts is a subject that has not 
been much studied by scholars, especially those from the fields of public administration and 
organizational studies. Taking into account the importance of these topics for the functioning of 
these organizations, the purpose of this essay is twofold: to enrich the debate on the contribution 
of good governance to the legitimacy of courts, and to encourage researchers to address these 
themes in greater depth. To this end, the main literature on governance and legitimacy of courts 
is analyzed. Theoretical approaches contribute to the discussion of the functioning of courts, 
which are highly institutionalized organizations that depend heavily on a presumption of 
legitimacy. Ensuring this legitimacy has been one of the challenges for these organizations, which 
are required to adopt governance models that contribute to better management and performance. 
We argue that there are managerial and substantive implications for society, since the governance 
and legitimacy of courts can affect the system of justice. We put forward some propositions on 
the influence of judicial governance on the legitimacy of the justice system and on the perception 
of legitimacy of the courts. These propositions provide insights for a research agenda on these 
issues. 
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The progressive emergence of social, political, and economic factors that frame the justice system 
as a space beyond the judiciary has increased pressure on courts to improve the efficiency, quality, 
and social distribution of justice. These efforts are related to mechanisms of public governance 
and are not limited to service delivery, but include the impact on society (Almquist, Grossi, 
Helden, & Reichard, 2013). We argue that judicial governance refers to practices and structures 
related to responsibilities and accountability, as well as acting in the public interest. In this sense, 
it is important to embrace governance and legitimacy in the same debate. 
 
Judicial decisions intervene in social relations in democratic societies. On the one hand, courts 
play an important role, and it needs to be recognized that “courts are governmental institutions 
and that judges are agents of society” (Garoupa & Ginsburg, 2015, p. 2). On the other hand, 
courts are subject to criticism, when, for example, they act as protagonists in promoting policies, 
as the Brazilian Supreme Court has on issues of political, health, scientific, social, and economic 
affairs. This has been described as supremocracy, where the Supreme Court exercises power over 
lower courts, to the detriment of the other powers of the republic (Brigida & Verbicaro, 2020; 
Vieira, 2017). 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court is usually seen as a political institution, in a pejorative sense, populated 
by liberal or conservative coalitions and, consequently, ideologically motivated, and subject to 
political manipulation (Fallon, 2018; Ramseyer, 1994). As Fallon (2018) says, “the people with 
the deepest, most corrosive cynicism about law and legitimacy of the Supreme Court are often 
those who began with the unrealistic expectation that the Justices’ decision-making could be 
wholly apolitical or untouched by ideological influence” (Fallon, 2018, p. xi). At the end of 2020, 
the presidential nomination of a conservative justice, following the death of Justice Ginsburg, a 
liberal icon, restarted the debate on reshaping the political-ideological balance of the U.S. 
Supreme Court, including advocacy movements for expanding the size of the court. 
 
The ultimate goal of courts is to maintain social balance and peace in social relations. They are, 
therefore, organizations whose legitimacy is taken for granted, or whose legitimacy is inherent in 
the existence of the organization. According to Gibson and Caldeira (1995), courts work under 
a “presumption of legitimacy” (Gibson & Caldeira, 1995, p. 464), and “legitimacy provides courts 
authority; it allows them the latitude necessary to make decisions contrary to the perceived 
immediate interests of their constituents” (Gibson & Caldeira, 1995, p. 460). Guimarães, 
Gomes, and Guarido (2018) suggest that most justice organizations, “especially the courts, police, 
and prisons, are highly institutionalized and legitimated in the sense that their existence and 
functioning are taken for granted” (Guimarães, Gomes, & Guarido, 2018, p. 478). 
 
This does not mean that legitimacy of courts is not contested, or that these organizations do not 
act to defend their own legitimacy. There are efforts in different countries to increase the 
efficiency and quality of justice, which may contribute to the legitimacy of the courts. The 
creation of the European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ) and the International 
Consortium for Court Excellence (ICCE) are examples of efforts along these lines. The Brazilian 





                               
 
Judiciary, especially the higher courts, has adopted strategies to increase their visibility and, 
consequently, create closer ties with society. Judges have given interviews to the media, 
contradicting the principle that ‘judges must only manifest themselves in the case file’; judgments 
have been broadcast live on TV and social media; the Brazilian National Council of Justice 
releases performance data from the country’s courts. These are indications of concern over the 
visibility, accountability, and legitimacy of the justice system. 
 
Legitimacy can also be conceived as a survival mechanism for courts, which need to be seen as 
“legitimate organizations” (Vergne, 2011, pp. 484-485) whose “existence, values, and behavior” 
(Vergne, 2011, pp. 484-485) are interpreted as congruent with social institutions, such as socially 
accepted rules, laws, and other patterns of conduct (Clayton, 1999; Gillman, 1999). The premise 
of legitimacy in different facets underpins an open discussion on the adoption of governance 
practices, as strategies for managing the legitimacy of the courts. 
 
This essay discusses how governance can contribute to explain the legitimacy of courts, suggesting 
an agenda for analyzing this relationship. Firstly, without the ambition to be exhaustive, we 
conceptualize governance and legitimacy in the context of courts. Secondly, we advance 
propositions that intersect both themes. The importance of this article lies in the discussion of 
two organizational variables — governance and legitimacy — applied to courts, from the 
perspective of a recursive relationship. Few articles have addressed these two topics together. A 
search of the Scopus database on February 7, 2021, with the search key Title-Abs-Key ((governance 
w/8 court*) and (legitimacy w/8 court*)) identified only five articles, of which one (Reinold, 
2019) seemed relevant to the purpose of this essay. However, that article addresses the two issues 
superficially. 
 
GOVERNANCE IN THE CONTEXT OF COURTS 
 
The concept of governance is addressed in different fields, such as economics, political science, 
international relations, and law. A common basis in these conceptions is a decision-making 
process that seeks to serve the interests of several stakeholders. Insofar as governance seeks to 
reconcile interests, the concept incorporates a positive sense of ‘good governance.’ An in-depth 
analysis of this theme goes beyond the scope of this essay and a review of governance from 
different theoretical perspectives can be found in Ciacchi (2014). 
 
The term ‘governance’ was popularized in the second half of the 20th century in the 
administration and economics literature. Corporate governance was initially related to 
companies’ best managerial practices. Later perspectives associated it with lower capital costs and 
more significant returns in terms of equity, efficiency, and more favorable treatment for 
stakeholders (Claessens, 2006). Corporate governance refers to the management of relationships 
between the company and its stakeholders, such as employees, customers, suppliers, and the 
government, aiming to mitigate and resolve conflicts between the interests of these parties. It is 
important to explore the concept of good governance applied to public administration and 
courts. 
 





                               
 
Broadly speaking, the governance of public administration involves the relationship between the 
state and society and focuses on the mode of governing. Governance, when associated with good 
public governance, presupposes a relationship model that favors a move from a hierarchical to a 
more cooperative model of governing, which may include several stakeholders, state and non-
state, and aim to “strike a balance between public power and civil society” (Buta, Guimarães, & 
Akutsu, 2020, p. 2). 
 
However, if the concept of public governance includes the participation of stakeholders in the 
decision-making process and in the provision of public services, it cannot be transferred directly 
to the courts. The literature covers various concerns around courts and their public (Bybee & 
Narasimhan, 2015; Epstein & Knight, 2004). Courts work to solve conflicts, interpreting and 
enforcing laws — and generally solving a conflict does not serve the interests of all parties involved. 
“Everyone has a stake” (Fallon, 2018, p. x). 
 
Courts deal with multiple stakeholders, both internal, like judges, and external, like the parties 
to the dispute, the executive and legislative branches, lawyers, and public prosecutors. All of them 
have diffuse and generally divergent interests. Moreover, courts have the power of self-control, 
which makes it difficult to identify who controls the judges. This all makes the governance of 
courts a multifaceted and complex issue to be analyzed. In fact, it can be said that the set of court 
stakeholders is society as a whole. 
 
Therefore, judicial governance needs to be understood from its own characteristics, different 
from those that apply enterprises and public administration in general, or even as a “tool for the 
democratization of the judiciary” (Tavares & Barbosa, 2016, p. 45). Emerging efforts on the topic 
in the field of management were summarized by Akutsu and Guimarães (2015) who suggested 
five dimensions of judicial governance: judicial performance; judicial independence; 
accountability and strategic resources of the judiciary; accessibility to justice; and structure of the 
judiciary. These authors also propose three levels of analysis to study judicial governance: 
institutional, organizational, and individual, with the goal of improving performance standards 
(Akutsu & Guimarães, 2015). Their approach to judicial governance makes important points. 
First, the multidimensional perspective stratifies the representation of governance in the sphere 
of justice organizations. Second, the three-level governance approach highlights practices as key 
elements for connecting organizational behavior to the formal rules of the institutional 
environment. 
 
There is little scientific literature on judicial governance, and the concept is generally 
characterized as part of court administration and evaluation models. The International 
Consortium for Court Excellence, for example, maintains the International Framework for 
Court Excellence, a quality management system designed to help courts improve their 
performance, in which governance is one of the dimensions of court administration 
(International Consortium for Court Excellence [ICCE], 2020). 
 
 





                               
 
LEGITIMACY IN THE CONTEXT OF COURTS 
 
Legitimacy is a concept that captures the relationship between authority and consent (Selznick, 
1992). Deference to authority, whether to a court, a rule, or a position, presumes consent, which 
means it is based on the idea of rightfulness — a “recognized claim of right” — that supports 
deference (Selznick, 1992, p. 266). As a consequence, courts or any other institution are subject 
to social acceptance of their authority; they are not inherently legitimate or illegitimate 
(Friedman, 2016; Selznick, 1992).  
 
In the organizational literature, under the tradition of sociological institutionalism, 
organizational legitimacy is a leading concept usually defined as “generalized perception or 
assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially 
constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” (Suchman, 1995, p. 574). 
Legitimacy links organizations and existing social parameters (Berger, Ridgeway, Fisek, & 
Norman, 1998; Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975), and is fundamental for growth, stability, and 
organizational survival (Díez-Martín, Prado-Roman, & Blanco-González, 2013). 
 
Several studies address court legitimacy. Gibson, Caldeira, and Baird (1998) investigated the 
relationship between the legitimacy of national high courts in different countries and their 
audiences. They showed that the legitimacy of courts is attached to people’s acceptance of their 
decisions. Nelson and Gibson (2019) investigated the impact of discursive attacks on the 
legitimacy of the U.S. Supreme Court. The impact of critical discourses depends on the reliability 
of the sources. Armaly (2020) showed that group loyalty intervenes in the relationship between 
perceived procedural fairness and social support for the U.S. Supreme Court. When court 
procedures benefit a group (e.g., partisans), unfairness is seen as acceptable by its members; 
beneficiaries of judicial impropriety are likely to support the court and not contest its legitimacy. 
 
Research on legitimacy is vast and encompasses efforts to capture its multidimensional structure 
(Bitektine & Haack, 2015) or alternative measurements of purpose (Alexiou & Wiggins, 2019; 
Vergne, 2011). Research examines what legitimacy is, where it occurs, and how it occurs 
(Suddaby, Bitektine, & Haack, 2017). Legitimacy as property focuses on the relationship between 
the organization and its external environment. On this view, legitimacy is considered to be an 
organizational attribute that results from the normative expectations of the organization’s 
behavior current in its environment. Legitimacy as process considers legitimacy as a social and 
political construction influenced by an ongoing interaction between a multiplicity of actors, 
typically organizations (Suddaby et al., 2017). Legitimacy as perception refers to evaluations or 
judgments of suitable actions that occur in interactions between organizations (the collective 
level) and individual actors (the individual level). Actors’ judgments and perceptions are the proxy 
to assess the degree of legitimacy of organizations (Suddaby et al., 2017). 
 
These perspectives on legitimacy (as property, process, and perception) could be useful in court 
research. In a preliminary outline, the presumed legitimacy is usually attached to courts (Gibson 
& Caldeira, 1995) due to the legality inherent to their regular exercise of coercive power. This 
view stresses legitimacy as an attribute, a capacity, or an asset possessed by courts, that is, 





                               
 
legitimacy as property. It may also be appropriate to treat legitimacy as a process or as perception. 
Courts are subject to many forms of contestation, over the performance of judges, efficiency 
criteria, decisions, the appropriateness of jurisdiction, and political bias. Court legitimacy is 
contentious and is dependent on how stakeholders perceive the suitability of their activities. For 
their part, courts manage judicial appearances to ensure the acceptability of their judicial power 
through communicative acts intended to project accessibility and fairness (Bybee & Narasimhan, 
2015; Gillman, 1999). Court legitimacy is contingent on political controversy, purposeful efforts, 
and mixed judgments of a plurality of social actors. 
 
Courts are perpetually asserting their legal and moral authority (Fallon, 2018). They are subject 
to social judgments, like other justice organizations, inhabiting the social space populated by 
multiple agents, including the media, parliament, control bodies, professionals, unions, and civil 
society organizations (Guimarães et al., 2018). Each exerts its influence on legitimacy, denoting a 
field-level perspective on legitimacy of justice organizations, or legitimacy as a social and 
contentious construction in the organizational (or social) field. 
 
In the field where court legitimacy is built, some dimensions deserve attention, such as the 
motivation for judgments, court design, the public perception of courts, the international scope 
of some laws, and the implications of court performance for the rule of law (Bybee & 
Narasimhan, 2015). Thinking about the social alignment between the courts and their context 
requires consideration of the performance of the judges, which involves the debate about 
impartiality and the motivations to judge. However, it also means looking at the social perception 
of the legal-political dilemma linked to judicial activities, highlighting the impact of these 
variables on people’s belief in judicial authority and the foundations of the rule of law (Bybee & 
Narasimhan, 2015). Attention to the social context in which the courts operate should be still 
greater, as a way to identify interest groups that can guarantee the legitimacy of these organizations 




Governance and legitimacy intersect in social and organizational dynamics. As governance is 
understood as a managerial mechanism that enhances and equals social participation, legitimacy 
is associated with social assessment and perception. By raising the notion of permeable 
boundaries between legitimacy and governance, it follows that judicial governance can influence 
the legitimacy of justice organizations in general and of courts in particular. Courts, like other 
organizations, adopt management and communication policies and strategies that privilege an 
image of behavior aligned with social expectations. 
 
Our assumption is that courts use governance to reinforce performance, efficiency, and 
effectiveness and, above all, legitimacy, as well as using judicial symbols. Regarding the 
relationship between symbols of justice, institutional support for decisions and perception of 
legitimacy of the U.S. Supreme Court, see Gibson, Lodge, and Woodson (2014). According to 
these authors, “symbols do not change attitudes; instead, they seem only to activate attitudes that 





                               
 
already exist. In some contexts, the symbols of judicial authority may well serve to delegitimize 
rather than legitimize courts” (Gibson, Lodge, & Woodson, pp. 860-861). 
 
This adds up to a concern for an adequate (or acceptable) cost-benefit ratio, with impartiality of 
judgments and transparency. These may increase organizational legitimacy, and it makes sense 
that stakeholders will accord legitimacy to the courts if they have a positive perception of their 
governance. To end this section, we set out a general claim and present three propositions (P1 to 
P3) addressing the relationship between judicial governance and the legitimacy of courts, as 
shown in Figure 1. Our intention is to provoke insights for future research, which could reinforce 
or even contradict the assertions that follow. 
 
 
Figure 1. Propositions 
 
 
The departure point is the premise that the legitimacy of a court is an institutional project 
involving both the advocacy of a plurality of stakeholders and the conditions of the social context. 
This project governs the conditions established in the dynamics of a social (or organizational) 
field. Similarly, the governance of a social system comprises government by a plurality of 
interdependent actors and socio-institutional arrangements. Therefore, it can be inferred that the 
governance and institutional legitimacy of courts have recursive relationships, so that they 
influence each other. 
 
Accordingly, we state that (P1) the better the perception of judicial governance in the social (or 
organizational) field, the greater the legitimacy of the court. Developing this proposition, it is 
reasonable to think about three conditions: openness, dissonance, and trustworthiness. As a first 
extension, the greater the openness of the field to multiple stakeholders interested in judicial 
governance, the greater the likelihood that governance arrangements positively influence the 
legitimacy of courts. As a second extension, dissonance arising from ambiguities in the perception 
of judicial governance negatively influences the legitimacy of courts. And, as a third extension, 
there is a positive influence of the commitment or conformity of courts to practices and structures 
of judicial governance on the legitimacy of the justice system as a whole. 





                               
 
 
At the organizational level, the reasoning above suggests that practices and structures of judicial 
governance positively influence the legitimacy of courts, moderated by conditions of the social 
context. Therefore, (P2) the better the judicial governance in the social (or organizational) field, 
the greater the likelihood that the courts will adopt such practices and structures and be perceived 
as legitimate. 
 
In justice systems, the conception and arrangement of judicial governance influence legitimacy 
of courts. As the conception of appropriate judicial governance becomes more homogeneous in 
an organizational field, it becomes more likely that the courts adopting such practices and 
structures will be perceived as legitimate. It is to be expected that structured arrangements of 
judicial governance, particularly when attached to performance evaluation by public agents, will 
increase the likelihood of courts adhering to such practices and structures perceived as legitimate. 
 
Going further, since courts are conceived as institutionalized organizations, it is necessary to 
consider their institutional and organizational facets. The former is related to “a sense of the 
rightfulness of authority” (Friedman, 2016, p. 193) at the institutional level. In this case, 
institutional authority and the legal order are the central objects. Conversely, the organizational 
facet considers the “rulers that occupy the power in a transitory way” (Dogan, 2002, p. 121), i.e., 
it focuses on organizations, as a transitory form of institution, in the contexts of their ordinary 
activities and on the social impact resulting from their behavior. 
 
These two layers of ordering and constitution of legitimacy should be noted in research of 
institutionalized organizations, as is the case of courts and most other justice organizations (Luz, 
Sousa, & Guarido, 2019). Fallon (2018) treated these double-edged claims to legitimate authority 
of courts as Janus-faced. The institutional legitimacy of courts is presumed, which follows from 
their authority in the institutional framework. However, courts, as organizations, ‘activate’ 
institutions, through their practices, processes, and constituents. Thus, the presumption of 
institutional legitimacy does not necessarily converge on organizational legitimacy. As a premise, 
we take it that institutional legitimacy and organizational legitimacy mutually reinforce each 
other. 
 
This legitimacy duality of courts, however, has a puzzling effect for the relationship between 
governance and legitimacy, which could be perverse. On the one hand, the perception of 
institutional legitimacy is strongly related to respect for authority, which may induce convergent 
organizational behavior, i.e., actions oriented to preserve the institutional character of an 
organization. However, on the other hand, institutional legitimacy may create a sense of 
overconfidence in authority that supports contradictory organizational behavior, that is, 
divergent actions that may attempt to present an institutional character based on a presumption 
of organizational legitimacy. 
 
In such situations, divergent behavior endangers institutional legitimacy through unsettled or 
erratic practices, even if these practices could contribute to a momentary organizational legitimacy 
in the short term. In the long term, divergent actions may also undermine organizational 





                               
 
legitimacy. That could be the case when considering courts and the adoption of practices or 
structures of judicial governance. Therefore, we state that (P3) the dissonance between the 
perception of institutional and organizational legitimacy in a social (or organizational) field 
influences negatively the possibility of adopting governance practices by courts, and, therefore, 




Courts operate in social contexts like any other organization. This means that although courts 
are institutionalized organizations, they are not immune to social evaluation, criticisms, and 
demands. It is central for any thinking about court performance to consider legitimacy seriously 
and, consequently, the governance issues that are attached on it. Throughout this article, we 
contend that there are several points of contact between governance and legitimacy of courts, 
including their recursive relationship. We briefly present three of them. First, the existence of a 
relationship between judicial governance and the legitimacy of courts. Second, as an extension 
from the former, judicial governance arrangements and practices can influence the legitimacy of 
the courts. And third, the eventual dissonance between the facets of legitimacy, institutional and 
organizational, pervades such a relationship and may influence the adoption of governance 
arrangements by the courts. As a preliminary conclusion, we intend to blaze a trail, but we have 
been selective and left aside other possible relationships. 
 
Our arguments draw attention to the fact that courts are a fertile field for studies related to the 
governance and legitimacy. Treating legitimacy and governance side-by-side (and not theoretically 
isolated) increases the potential for explaining the actual conditions of courts. By designing 
research problems of governance and legitimacy in the judicial sphere, a researcher or a 
practitioner will deal, simultaneously, with the organizational and the institutional facets of the 
courts. This means that, in addition to any managerial aspect, the institutional contours related 
to the justice system have material and moral implications. After all, for courts “to be 
authoritative requires, in essence, a reputation for good decision-making” (Garoupa & Ginsburg, 
2015, p. 2). 
 
This essay is an invitation to pay closer attention to courts as objects of interest to researchers, 
because of their specific characteristics and their importance in the larger apparatus of the justice 
system. It is an invitation to recognize that research with courts is research into justice, which 
means to be concerned with a moral domain of society in which organizations navigate. And, 
finally, it is an invitation to consider the organizational dimensions, such as legitimacy and 
governance, in analysis of legal agents. Courts are not a judicial object of interest only to the law 
or legal sciences. There are managerial and substantive implications of these organizations in 
society, and organizational and public administration studies must not be reticent in the face of 
the opportunities to contribute to the increasing knowledge of these issues. 
 
Finally, carrying out empirical research on the governance and legitimacy of courts, as suggested 
by propositions 1 to 3, may use different methods and techniques. Governance practices and 
structure of courts can be investigated by conducting case studies, comparative research, or 





                               
 
documentary analysis. These are in contrast with surveys of perceptions and interviews with 
various court stakeholders to describe and test their influence on court legitimacy. Content 
analysis and speech techniques are useful to analyze texts and news broadcast by different media 
related to court decisions and behaviors. The analysis of the repercussion on media and different 
kinds of surveys that monitor procedural practices, obedience to judicial decisions, reputation, 
or other types of court trustworthiness could be useful for legitimacy research. In this sense, 
discourse analysis could confirm the dissonance between the organizational and the institutional 
levels of analysis. There is a great research avenue to be followed in this field, still heavily 
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